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Smith: Bail or Jail: Toward an Alternative

NOTES
BAIL OR JAIL: TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE*
The American bail system as it now operates can no longer be tolerated. At
best, it is a system of checkbook justice; at worst a
highly commercialized racket.
-Arthur J. Goldberg, Former Associate Justice,
Supreme Court of the United States'
Ideally, a person arrested and accused of a crime would be brought
immediately before a jury of his peers for trial. Unfortunately, the wheels of
justice do not grind so swiftly. Even assuming that such a system would be
administratively feasible, both the state and the defendant must have ample
opportunity to prepare their case. The current practice of release on bail
during the interim between arrest and trial has been greatly affected by
tradition stemming at least from pre-Norman England.2 While the surety's
raison d'etre - to insure the defendant's appearance in courts - has remained
the same, the reason for releasing the accused before trial has changed considerably. Pollock and Maitland note that while it was unusual to keep men
in prison prior to trial under the common law, this apparent leniency "was
not due to any love of abstract liberty. Imprisonment was costly and trouble4
some" and probably ineffective because of the great number of escapes.
Nevertheless, the law has recognized from the earliest times that even if he
could not avail himself of bail, a prisoner awaiting trial does not share the
status of one already convicted and serving his sentence.5 Since the former
individual has not been "delivered by due course of law" his imprisonment is
only for safe custody.6 The concept that a man is "innocent until proven
*This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the best student
note submitted Winter 1968 Term.
1. Goldberg, Foreword to I. GouzPAR,

RANSOM: A CRITIQUB OF THE AMERICAN BAIL
SYSTEM at ix (1965).
2. See generally 5 BLAcKSTONE, ComMErrAREs *297-300; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArTLAND,
TrE HIsTORY OF ENGL IsH LAW 584-90 (2d ed. 1898); J. STEPHEN, A HisroRY or THE CRIMINAL
LAw oF ENGLAND 233 (1883).

3. "Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible persons to stand as
sureties for the accused, the modem practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a

sum of money subject to the forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an
accused." Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). Ex parte Brumback, 46 Cal. 2d 810, 299
P.2d 217 (1956); Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So. 2d 267 (1943); 1 F. POLLOCK & E.
MArrLAND, supra note 2, at 584.
4. 1 F. POLLOCK & E. MArrLAND, supra note 2, at 584.
5. Imprisonment pending trial "is only for safe custody, and not for punishment:
therefore, in this dubious interval between commitment and trial, a prisoner ought to be
used with utmost humanity . . . subjected to [no] other hardships than such as are
absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only ....
".4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300.
6. Id. Under current practices, however, a person confined before trial receives no better
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guilty," while actually a rule as evidence, 7 has been most influential in the evolution of the present theory of pretrial bail8 in both the federal 9 and state
systems. 1 Although not cited as often, permitting the accused to prepare his
defense unhampered by imprisonment is another reason, perhaps as important
as preserving the presumption of innocence, for maintaining a bail system
leading to the release of defendants before trial."
THE PROFESSIONAL BAIL BONDSMAN

In England, since release on bail implied an intimate relationship in
which the security (usually a member of the propertied class) assumed personal responsibility for the accused, bail carried a far different connotation
than does the modern American bail practice. The bail system in the United
States is one of only two such systems in the world 12 in which professional
bondsmen are not only tolerated but are encouraged by law. 3 Geographical
treatment than his convicted cellmate. For example, he is still compelled to appear in
lineups. Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965). See Comment, May a State
Compel Unbailed Defendants To Appear in Lineups?, 19 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 197 (1966). Indeed, some contend that oftentimes he is treated worse than a convicted prisoner. See, e.g.,
Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 960 (1965); Note,
Bail: A Pending Constitutional Problem, 4 GA. ST. B.J. 278, 291 (1967).
7. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2511 (3d ed. 1940).
8. But see Smith, Bail Before Trial: Reflections of a Scottish Lawyer, 108 U. PA. L.
REv. 305, 322 (1960). Professor Smith states: "[B]ut, if this [presumption of innocence]
were really the kernel of the matter, all suspects would be bailed. As it is, in American
practice it would seem that the presumption is sometimes invoked to let loose on the public,
pending trial, a number of wealthy suspects who, whatever the presumption in their favour,
do not act while on bail like innocent men." Id. at 322.
9. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) in which the Court warns that "unless
this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning." Id. at 4; Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285
(1895); the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §3146 (Supp. II, 1967), carries this
theory to its logical extreme. The official purpose of the act is to "assure that all persons,
regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their appearance
to answer charges, to testify or pending appeal, when detention serves neither the ends
of justice nor the public interest."
10. See, e.g., Matera v .Buchanan, 192 So. 2d 18 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966), in which the
court concluded: "[U]nder our system of constitutional government, the right to bail prior
to trial of one accused of a non-capital crime is absolute. Every accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty." See also State ex rel. Crabb v. Carson, 189 So. 2d 376 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Green v. Petit, 222 Ind. 467, 54 N.E.2d 281 (1944).
11. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); for a careful analysis of the correlation between
subsequent outcome at a trial and release from jail prior to trial see Rankin, The Effect of
Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964). See also Hearings on S. 2838, 2839,
2840 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,88th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1964).
12. The other is the Philippine Islands. Hearings on S. 1357, 646, 647, 648 Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings]; Symposium: Conditional Release Pending Trial, 108 U. PA. L.
REv. 290 (1960). Professional bondsmen exist in Canada's largest cities but their legal status
is precarious. McWilliams, The Law of Bail, 9 CRIM. L. INsTrrsrre 21 (1966).
13. For a discussion of the various state provisions dealing with the regulation of bonds-
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and cultural differences between England and the Colonies contributed
greatly to the rise of this curious trade in America. Unlike England, America
was a vast territory where people knew little of each other's backgrounds.
Courts found it difficult to judge the trustworthiness of prospective sureties
and many newcomers were without personal friends or relatives to aid them
in securing bail.14 The commercial bondsman was thus a welcomed innovation, and money security began to replace personal sponsorship. 15 Since the
surety's promise to insure the defendant's appearance in court often entailed
the impossible task of conducting a nationwide search, courts would release
the obligation of the bondsman by forfeiture of a stipulated sum of money.
The promise to produce the accused gradually became a mere promise to pay
money upon his failure to appear.16 Emerging from this development, the
modem commercial bondsman, whose main interest is financial gain,'y retained few of the characteristics of the original bondsman. 18
Unfortunately, the evolution of the commercial bondsman brought about
a change that was not limited to loss of personal security arrangements. Because of his natural quest for profit, the professional bondsman caused the
bail system to "degenerate into a two-way door, opening outward to pretrial
liberty for defendants with funds, but inward to prolonged confinement for
defendants without money to post bond."' 9 The American bail system discriminates against the poor 20 who cannot afford the premium charged for
a bail bond,21 much less post the face amount themselves.2 2 Since the bondsman makes the ultimate determination whether a bond will be posted, the
indigent may be required to stay in jail while others go free.23
men see Murphy, State Control of the Operation of Professional Bailbondsmen, 36 U. CN.
L. REv. 375 (1967).
14. R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 93 (1965).
15. Id. at 94.
16. Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YA.E L.J. 966, 967 (1961).
17. 1965 Hearings at 127. The bondsman's risk of forfeiture is extremely light in comparison with his profits. One New York company, for example, issued 19,397 bail bonds
during 1957. Of this amount only 284 (1%) were forfeited and of this number 208 defendants were later produced in court-with the ultimate result that in only 76 cases did
the surety company actually lose the face amount of the bond. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The
Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole,38 N.Y.U.L. Rxv.
67, 82 (1963). See also 1965 Hearingsat 190-93.

18. Courts, nevertheless, have continued to pay lip service to the idea that the bondsman is a guardian of the released. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371
(1872) ("their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment"); Capitol Indemnity Ins. Co. v. State, 86 So. 2d 156, 157 (Fla. 1956) ("friendly jailer"); cf. FLA. STAT.
§903.22 (1967).
19. Interim Report of the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, 1965
Hearingsat 42.

20. A person has been considered a member of the "hard core" poor class if he is
is among the 35 million Americans (one-fifth of the entire population) who lives on a
family income of less than $60 per week. 1965 Hearings at 85.
21. The premium is usually either 5% or 10% of the amount of the bond. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 14, at 32; cf. FIA. STAT. §903.42 (1967).
22. The average bail bond is $500. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 14, at 32.
23. Lay, Pre-Trial Release of Indigents in the United States, 2 U. TASMANIA L. R.v.
300 (1966).
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THE BAIL SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT

A study of the bail system in the District of Columbia during 1963
revealed that fifty-two per cent of all bondable defendants remained in jail
prior to their trial.2 4 The higher the amount of bail, the fewer the number
of defendants that were able to post bond. The median time spent in jail
between arrest and final disposition of the case was seventy-five days. 2 5
Research studies strongly indicate that a person stands a substantially
better chance of being found not guilty or of receiving a lighter sentence if
he is free during the time between arrest and trial.26 This factor, coupled with
the fact that innocent defendants unable to afford bond will sometimes plead
guilty in desperation,2 7 suggests that the law discriminates against the poor
not only in the process available for release before trial but also as a direct
result of this process in the ultimate determination of guilt.
Such discrimination raises a question whether the operation of the
present bail system works a denial of equal protection.28 Although there are
rare cases indicating a contrary result,29 appellate courts today generally will
not attack as "excessive" the amount of bail set by the trial court merely
because a person cannot afford to raise it.3° In White v. United States,3 1 for
example, bail had been set at 5,000 dollars after an indictment had been
brought charging the defendant with narcotics violations. In denying his
appeal from a subsequent conviction, the court of appeals rejected defendant's argument that since he lacked funds and was consequently detained in
jail and hampered in preparation of his defense, his bail must have been
excessive: 3
24. McCarthy & Wahl, The District of Columbia Bail Project: An Illustration of Experimentation and a Brief for Change, 53 GEo. L.J. 675, 685 (1965). See also Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 631, 634 (1964).
25. McCarthy 8 Wahl, supra note 24; Wald, supra note 24. A sample of 3,459 cases in
New York City in 1960 revealed that the median time spent in jail between arraignment and
adjudication was 32 days. Ares, Rankin & Sturtz, supra note 17, at 83.
26. See Rankin, supra note 11, at 641. The study demonstrated a noticeable correlation
between pretrial detention and conviction even when other factors that might affect the
outcome (e.g., a person on bail would be better able to afford an attorney) were held
constant. See also R. GOLDFARB, supra note 14, at 38; Ares, Rankin & Sturz supra note 17,
at 84.
27. See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 39-40 (1964);
Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromise by Prosecutors To Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA.
L. Rav. 865 (1964).
28. See generally Foote, supra note 6, at 95; Paulsen, Pre Trial Release in the United
States, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 109 (1966); Note, Preventative Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 1489 (1966); Note, Indigent Court Costs and Bail: Charge Them to Equal Protection, 27 MD.L. REV. 154 (1967).
29. See, e.g., Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 13 (Douglas, J., acting as single
Justice pending disposition of petition for certiorari) (1961), ("[N]o man should be denied
release because of indigence"). In Harrison v. Stone, 113 Fla. 471, 152 So. 19 (1934), the
court was obviously moved by the fact that defendant was a laboring man with a dependent
family and therefore unable to give more than $1,000 bond pending action by a grand jury.
30. Carlson v. Landon 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Alston v. United States, 343 F.2d 345 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
31. 330 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1964).
32. Id. at 814.
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The mere financial inability of the defendant to post an amount
otherwise meeting the standard does not automatically indicate excessiveness. The purpose for bail cannot in all instances be served by
only accommodating the defendant's pocketbook and his desire to be
free pending possible conviction.
More recently the New York Court of Appeals refused to consider the
equal protection issue raised by an accused indigent who was detained in
jail prior to trial.33 His bond had been set at 1,000 dollars even though he
was nineteen years old, had resided at the same address for two years, had
a steady job, and had no previous criminal record. The court recognized that
it "would be less than candid if [it] . . . did not admit that the present
bail system is subject to abuse," nevertheless, the court found no abuse of
the lower tribunal's discretion in setting bail at an amount the accused was
4
unable to afford.3
Ignoring the factor of indigency in determining what constitutes "excessive" bail seems diametrically opposed to the reasoning developed in the Supreme Court "poverty" cases.35 In Griffin v. Illinois 6 the Supreme Court
took the position that a statute denied an indigent equal protection of the
law if it had the practical, although unintentional, effect of barring him from
appealing his criminal conviction solely because of his indigency: "There
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has." S A state, in effect, must insure that appellate
mechanisms will not place a defendant in an inferior position before the
court solely because of indigency.
In addition to being placed on an unequal level at the time of trial,38 a
defendant who cannot afford bail suffers the loss of other - if not all - basic
rights; he is denied freedom itself. 39 Confining an indigent without sufficient
regard to other criteria40 (which, if considered, might allow him to be released
as a good risk), may be a denial of his right to be treated equally under the
83. People v. Warden, Brooklyn House of Detention, 21 N.Y.2d 18, 28 N.E.2d 265, 286
N.Y.S.2d 240 (1967).
84. Id. at 24, 283 N.E.2d at 268, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 244. In regard to a nonfinanciallyoriented system of bail the court announced: "It is our opinion that the adoption of such
a system is more properly within the province of the Legislature." Id.
85. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1968); Lane v. Brown, 872 U.S. 477 (1968);
Douglas v. California, 872 U.S. 858 (1968); Smith v. Bennet, 865 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v.
Ohio, 860 U.S. 252 (1959); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 857
U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 851 U.S. 12 (1956).
86. 851 US. 12 (1956).
87. Id. at 19.
88. For the proposition that pretrial detention of an accused adversely affects the
outcome of his trial see supra note 26.
89. Nor is such a defendant's imprisonment for "safe custody" any less severe than
that of a convicted criminal. See supra note 6.
40. Such criteria may include, for example: the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, the weight of the evidence, family ties, employment, character and mental condition, length of residence in a community, past record of conviction, and past record of
appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution. See Federal Bail Reform
Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §3146 (b) (Supp. II, 1967).
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law.41 Mr. Justice Douglas expressed the view in Brady v. United States:4 2
[T]he theory [of bail) is based on the assumption that a defendant
has property. To continue to demand a substantial bond which the
defendant is unable to secure raises considerable problems for the
equal administration of the law. We have held that an indigent
defendant is denied equal protection of the law if he is denied an
appeal on equal terms with other defendants, solely because of his
indigence .... Can an indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy
man would not, because he does not happen to have enough property
to pledge for his freedom?
In addition to raising the equal protection argument, an indigent confined before trial might attack the operation of the present bail system as a
denial of his "right to bail" as implied from the eighth amendment's proscription against excessive bail.4 3 Arguably, the scope of this right to bail must
include an examination by a court into the financial condition of the accused.
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely met the issue, 4 dicta in the
case of Stack v. Boyle 45 might support such a position. After noting that
setting excessive bail merely to keep a defendant in jail clearly violates the
philosophy of bail, Mr. Justice Jackson added in a concurring opinion: "This
is not to say that every defendant is entitled to such bail as he can provide,
but he is entitled to an opportunity to make it in a reasonable amount." 46
Nevertheless, in most cases bail continues to be set by schedules according to
the crime, 47 and the fundamental right to bail implied in the eighth amend41. It has been argued, on the other hand, that imposing a risk of financial loss serves
the purpose of turning a "bad risk" into a good one and that the operation of the present
bail system will therefore be free of "invidious discrimination." See Paulsen, Pre-Trial Release in the United States, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 109, 122 (1966).
42. 81 S. Ct. 197-98 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1960).
43. Professor Caleb Foote, who traced the history of the eighth amendment, concluded
that the anomaly of a right to no excessive bail without a right to bail per se is still not
explained. (Although the author himself gives a credible explanation for the phenomenon.)
Nevertheless, the amendment is open to only three interpretations according to Foote: (1)
The eighth amendment must rely upon some other source of law to supply the right to
hail-and only then does the amendment act to protect against excessiveness (the result
here is that Congress could effectively avoid a provision of the Constitution merely by
failing to act); (2) that courts have discretion whether to grant ordinary bail, but if they
grant bail it cannot be excessive (the result here is that courts wishing to set excessive
bail can accomplish the same result by denying bail altogether- i.e., doing indirectly what
they could not do directly); (3)a constitutional right to bail must be implied from the
excessive bail clause. Professor Foote states that the third interpretation is the only logical
one. The only problem left, then, is to define the scope of the right. See Foote, supra note
6.
44. But see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), where the Court concluded that
the eighth amendment did not compel the allowance of bail in a deportation case. However, this was a 5-4 decision and did not deal with a criminal prosecution. The case has
been severely criticized. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 6, at 969-70.
45. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
46. Id. at 10 (Jackson, J., concurring).
47. R. GOLDFARB, supra note 14, at 16; Foote, supra note 6, at 995-96; Note, Bail Reform
in the State and Federal Systems, 20 VAND. L. REv. 948 (1967).
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ment is thus automatically foreclosed for indigents unable to afford the
amount set. The advantage to all defendants of pretrial release based on an
absolute right to bail stemming from the eighth amendment is that so
grounding the right eliminates almost all judicial discretion to refuse release.
The court cannot deny bail altogether, nor set it high hoping the accused
will be unable to raise it.
RELEASE ON THE AccuszD's OwN RECOGNIZANCE

Since the primary purpose of pretrial bail today is to insure the appearance of the accused at trial, the injustice imposed on indigents by modern
bail practices is especially troublesome in light of the overwhelming evidence
from recent studies that release based on criteria other than financial resources
is equally or more likely to insure defendant's appearance at trial.48 Although
it is generally agreed that the grant of authority to set bail does not preclude
releasing a prisoner on his own recognizance without bail,49 the method has
been too often ignored.50 Of 2,052 criminal cases studied in the District of
Columbia in 1963 only fifteen defendants or 0.7 per cent were released on
personal recognizance. 53 Publicity given to the success of recent experimentations with release on recognizance, however, caused a significant increase in
52
use of this method in the last few years.
The philosophy behind the Manhattan Bail Project 53 was a closer examination of factors besides mere financial ability that might indicate whether
a person would be a good risk to release on recognizance. The criteria used
in determining the risk included: (1) residence (whether the accused had
resided at the same address for six months or more), (2) current employment,
(3) family ties in the area, (4) previous criminal record, and (5) references.
During the three-year period ending August 31, 1964, 3,505 accused persons
were released on recognizance, having been deemed "good risks" according
to the above criteria. Of this number 98.4 per cent returned to court when

48. "All studies we have seen show that large numbers of defendants whom the bail
systems holds [sic] can safely be released with little risk of flight or criminal conduct." Statement of Honorable Ramsey Clark, Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States. 1965 Hearings
at 29.
49. 8 AM. JuR. 2d Bail and Recognizance §6 (1963). Failure to require bail, however,
may be unlawful when it amounts to a gross abuse of discretion. McNair's Petition, 324 Pa.
48, 18 A. 498 (1936).
50. Arthur Beeley, who conducted one of the earliest and still valuable studies of contemporary bail systems, reached this conclusion as early as 1927. See A. BsxseY, THE BAI.
SYsTEM iN CHICAcO 155 (1927).

51. McCarthy &Wahl, supra note 24, at 684.
52.

NAT'L CONMERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTIcE, INTERIM REP., 1965 Hearings at

44-49.
53. The project was instituted largely through the efforts of Louis Schwitzer, a New
York industrialist, who took an interest in helping indigent youthful offenders. He established the Vera Foundation, which with the aid and cooperation of the New York University School of Law and the Institute of Judicial Administration, conducted-the Manhattan Bail Project experiment. Ares, Rankin & Sturz, supra note 17, at 67-68.
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required. Only fifty-six persons (1.6 per cent) wilfully failed to appear. 54
This percentage was lower than that of those released on bond. 55
In Illinois a joint committee to revise the state's criminal code was appointed in 1954. After completely revising substantive criminal law, the
committee turned its attention to the problem of bail. The heart of the
problem, as seen by the committee, was "how to regain from professional
bondsmen the control of bail releases and to restore such control to the
courts, where it belongs." 5 6 The solution recommended by the committee
and made a temporary part of the Illinois criminal procedure in 1963 was
a plan by which "the accused could obtain his release by executing a bond
in the amount of the bail set and depositing ten per cent of such amount in
cash with the clerk of the court. If he complied with all the conditions of
his bond, ninety per cent of his cash deposit would be refunded ..... 57 Bail
bondsmen made dire predictions that the number of nonappearances or
"jumps" under the ten per cent plan would far exceed the number under
surety bonds.58 The results of the first year, however, indicated that just the
opposite was true: "The percentage of jumps under the 10 per cent provision,
in both felonies and misdemeanors, is significantly smaller than under surety
bond." 59 The success of the plan is evidenced by the fact that in 1965 the
Illinois General Assembly not only extended it indefinitely, but also repealed
all laws permitting any other method of giving, taking, or enforcing bail.60
Not only does the Illinois plan eliminate the bondsman, it also tends to save
the defendant money and allow him to obtain bail more easily. 61
After studying the problems and inequities caused by operation of the
traditional professional bonding system in the District of Columbia, a proposal was made to the Circuit Conference of 1963 which included, among
other remedies, the inauguration of a pilot experiment based on the experience of the Manhattan Bail Project. 62 The District of Columbia project
likewise called for inquiry into relevant factors leading to recommendation of
release on personal recognizance. A report after the first year of operation
of the project concluded, as did reports on the Manhattan Bail Project, that
the rate of return was "equal, if not superior, to that of defendants on surety
bond in the District of Columbia."63
Numerous other studies of release on recognizance corroborate the results
of the Manhattan and District of Columbia bail projects. Encouraged by
these studies and concerned with the high pretrial detention rate, the proba54.

NAT'L CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INTERIM

REP.,

1965 Hearings at

51.
55. Three per cent of those released on bond failed to appear. Id.
56. Statement of Professor Charles H. Bowman, Professor of Law, University of Illinois,
1965 Hearings at 189.
57. Id. at 190-91.
58. Id. at 192.
59. Id.
60. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §110.7 (Smith-Hurd 1967).
61. See R. GOLDFARB, supra note 14, at 199.
62. McCarthy &Wahl, supra note 24.
63.

Id. at 731.
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don office of the United States District Court for the Northern Disrict of
California, for example, went on a bail factfinding project in April 1964.
Robert F. Scott, deputy chief probation officer, reported that: "Based on our
experiment, it is believed the bail investigation process [release on recognizance] is definitely warranted. . . ."64 In 1964 a similar project in Jefferson
County, Kentucky, also met with great success. 6 5 In Massachusetts, the first
state to enact a bail reform act patterned after the federal model,66 the
success of release on recognizance was shown from a study in Suffolk County,
Massachusetts, where sixty-two per cent of all the accused were released on
recognizance; only one per cent defaulted. 67 There does not seem to be any
substantial difference in the success of release on recognizance when it is
limited to misdemeanors. A study in Richmond, California (population
80,000) indicated that under a California statute 8 almost all defendants
charged with misdemeanors (not including public intoxication) who had
identification and a California address were released on recognizance. 69 Only
two per cent of these failed to appear in court.70 The projects and studies
cited above are but a fraction of the total number of those being carried on
with apparent success in the United States today. As early as 1965, the
National Conference on Bail reported that seventy-eight cities and counties
1
were operating or had proposed to operate such projects7
THE PROBLEM OF PRETRIAL DETENTION

One of the evils of the present commercial bonding system is the ease with
which its functions can be distorted to suit the whim of a particular judge
or prosecutor. By denying bail altogether72 or by setting exorbitant bail,
lower courts often have been effective in (1) giving the accused "a taste of
jail," (2) making an "example out of" him, (3) inducing him to cooperate
with the prosecution, or (4) punishing him for participation in civil rights
demonstrations. 73 In addition, however, the refusal to grant bail or setting
64. Scott, Bail Factfinding Project at San Francisco, 30 FED.

PROBATION,

39, 41 (Dec.

1966).
65. Lay, supra note 23, at 810.
66. Mass. Bail Reform Act MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 276, §42 (1966). The
apply to offenses occurring under jurisdiction of district courts. The act
experimentation and became inoperative on July 1, 1968, when it was not
67. Spongenberg, Bail Reform in Massachusetts, 52 MAss. L.Q. 135
68. CAL. PENAL CODE §853.6 (West 1967).
69. Note, An Alternative to the Bail System Penal Code Section 853.6,

act was made to
was in effect an
reenacted.
(1967).

18 HASTINGS

L.J.

643 (1967).

70. Id. at 645.
71. 1965 Hearings at 47-48. Included were three Florida cities: Jacksonville, Miami,

and Orlando.
72. Of course an arbitrary denial of bail is clearly illegal and would be reversed on
appeal. Nevertheless, this method is used by some lower courts since the ruling either is
not appealed or the time which elapses between the ruling and a successful appeal will
serve the judge's purpose. R. Go.DFAm, supra note 14, at 62-64.
73. Id. at 72; Foote, supra note 6, at 1145; Note, Preventative Detention Before Trial,
79 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1507 (1966).
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"excessive" bail allows a court to (1) prevent "subversion,"7 4 (2) protect
society against dangerous criminals, (3) prevent a defendant from destroying
evidence, (4) protect the defendant against his own self-destruction, and
(5) aid in the quelling of riots.75 While few would admit that the first four
reasons given by courts for disallowing release will lead to any long-range
benefit to society, it has been urged by some writers76 that some, if not all,
of the latter five reasons either are, or should be sufficient to allow a court
to exercise preventive detention.
Even England,77 which fostered our bail system, openly practices preventive detention as do Japan,7 8 France, 79 Sweden, 0 Denmark, 8 1 Norway, 2 and
Russia. 3 It is probably true that courts in the United States do in fact
practice "preventive detention" far more extensively than is commonly recognized.8 4 The practice, however, has been kept secret since most states grant
an absolute right to bail, and the command against "excessive' bail in the
eighth amendment may well imply an absolute right to bail.8 3 In fact, it
was this fear of unconstitutionality that prevented any attempt to include a
preventive detention clause in the Bail Reform Act of 1966.0
A Florida case illustrates the problem facing a judge who feels a defendant
should not be released but is apparently without means to detain him - other
than by denying bail or setting it extremely high. In Varholy v. Sweat, 7 the
defendant was charged with the offense of being drunk and disorderly. In
her petition for habeas corpus, she complained that the lower court had set
her appearance bond at an excessive amount, 8 especially in light of the fact
that there was no proper ground to hold her to answer to the charge. A
74. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), in which the court indicated it
considered the government's purpose-to prevent release of aliens charged with violation
of the Smith Act-to be valid since such aliens by their subversive tendencies posed a
threat to the Nation.
75. 1965 Hearings at 294-95; Paulsen, Pre-Trial Release in the United States, 66
COLUM. L. Rev. 109 (1966). See also R. GOLDFAPB, supra note 14, at 127-49.
76. Paulsen, supra note 75; Note, Preventative Detention, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 178
(1967); Note, Preventative Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1489 (1966); Note,
Bail Reform in the State and Federal Systems, 20 VAND. L. REv. 948 (1967. See also 1965
Hearings at 892-99.
77. Rex v. Phillips, 32 Crim. App. Rep. 47 (1947), held that a court in setting bail
should concern itself with evidence concerning the probability that the accused will, if
released on bail, commit further offenses. The case has been followed to some extent in
Canada. McWilliams, The Law of Bail, 9 CRIM. L.Q. 21 (1966).
78. Dondo & Tamiya, Conditional Release of an Accused in Japan, 108 U. PA. L. Rev.

323 (1960).
79. Vouin, Provisional Release in French Penal Law, 108 U. PA. L. Rev. 355 (1960).
80. Bratholm, Arrest and Detention in Norway, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 336, 342-43 (1960).
81.

Id.

82. Bratholm, supra note 80.
83. 1965 Hearingsat 209.
84. Id. at 294.
85. Ervin, Legislative Role in Bail Reform, 35 GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 429 (1967); Foote,

supra note 6.
86. S. Rep. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
87. 153 Fla. 571, 15 So. 2d 267 (1943).
88. Bond was set at $500. Id. at 573, 15 So. 2d at 268.
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physician testified, however, that the defendant's voluntary submission to a
medical examination disclosed she was infected with gonorrhea, a highly
communicable veneral disease, and should be quarantined. 89 The lower
court's announcement that once the petitioner was cured, the bond would be
reduced to a "nominal sum," 90 left no doubt that the purpose in setting high
bond was to detain the defendant. Such detention in this case could be
justified under a state health regulation 9 and the Florida supreme court
never had to reach the question of excessive bail. It is not difficult to see,
however, that in other cases a judge who may in conscience feel justified in
detaining an accused might be without such "justification" under the law.
When such a case arises he is forced either to obey his conscience and resort
to high bail or denial, or to follow the law, release the accused, and bury his
conscience. The possibility of an alternative that would allow him to follow
both the law and his conscience should be carefully studied.92 Bringing
preventive detention into the open with well-established guidelines would at
worst force a long-awaited judicial determination of the constitutional issues
involved. At best it would present a predictable and controlled system, which
would complement a program for release on recognizance.
The problems raised by proposals for open preventive detention are
many and difficult. It cannot be ignored that the operation of the present
bail system allows such detention, albeit in clandestine form. An honest
approach to the problem of bail reform must recognize that substitution of
the present commercial bonding system with a program based on release on
recognizance will have the effect of disrupting the present sub rosa practice
of preventive detention. While it may properly be asked what will prevent
a judge from continuing to abuse his discretion under a system of release on
recognizance, two answers immediately suggest themselves. Under the Federal
Bail Reform Act,93 the accused is presumed releasable. If the court finds he
is not, the defendant is entitled to know the reasons,94 from which appeal
may be taken.9 5 If the court fails to submit reasons, the defendant is automatically released. 0 Another solution might be to establish a board whose
sole function is to determine the releasability of the accused. The decision
of this board may be made binding on the court. Whatever solution is
adopted, the problem of doing away with the sub rosa practice of preventive
detention will remain. In enacting the Bail Reform Act of 1966, Congress
was faced with the same problem, but the need to correct the inequities caused

89. Id.

90. Id. at 577, 15 So. 2d at 270.
91.

FLA. STAT. §384.09 (1941).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

For a list of some recent articles written on this topic see supra note 76.
18 U.S.C. §3146 (c) (1968); cf. S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 12 (1965).
18 U.S.C. §3146(c) (1968).
See S. Ra. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 17 (1965).
18 U.S.C. §3146(d) (1968). The reason for denying release must be given within

twenty-four hours of such a denial. Id.
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by the commercial bonding system overrode any present consideration of
preventive detention. 97 Florida might well do likewise. 98
AN ALTERNATIVE

TO THE

PRESENT

BAIL SYSTEM

IN

FLORIDA

Upon signing the Bail Reform Act of 1966, President Johnson remarked
that the measure would "provide an enlightened model for those States and
communities which have not already undertaken bail reform." 99 A bail reform
act in two parts was proposed in the 1967 session of the Florida legislature. 1°0
One part dealt directly with the present bail problem adopting almost
verbatim the provisions of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966. The second
part proposed a summons system to replace the present arrest procedures in
certain cases. Due largely to pressure from commercial bondsmen, the bill
died in committee.1° 1

In addition to the criticism leveled against the bill by bondsmen, there
was some comment from lower court judges reflecting the attitude that this
was but another bill to protect criminals:102

The provisions of this bill [No. 426] will aid most favorably that
person that set the entire process in motion by committing some
violation of the law and would undoubtedly result in the taxpayer
being required to hire more people to investigate, keep track of, and
chase down those scofflaws that will not show up. We are already
coddling such people with free legal services, free costs paid for by
taxpayers, free psychiatric and medical examinations, and free public
assistance which is required because of the actions of these individuals.
This criticism ignores altogether the presumption of innocence that is the
basis of our present bail system. 103 Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence10
to indicate that the money saved by ridding our jails of those accused and
awaiting trial would more than pay for the administration of the system as
well as for chasing down "scofflaws" who fail to appear. Indeed it may be that
the financial burden of chasing down defendants who fail to appear is already
borne by the government.' 05
97. Senator Ervin, Chairman of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. stated:
"While it is recognized that the preventative detention problem is intimately related to the
bail reform problem, the committee feels that the need for reform of existing bail procedures is so pressing that such reform should not be delayed with the hope of enacting
more comprehensive legislation that might deal also with the preventative detention problem." S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1965).
98. See, e.g., S.B. 426, 41st Sess. (1967 Fla. Legislature).
99. 112 CONG. REC. 5370 (1966).
100. See S.B. 426, 41st Sess. (1967 Fla. Legislature).
101. Letter from State Senator Lawton Chiles to the University of Florida Law Review,
Nov. 3, 1967. State Senators Lawton Chiles and Edmond Gong proposed the bill.
102. Letter to members of Senate Judiciary Committee "D," April 24, 1967 (emphasis
added).
103. Cases cited supra notes 9, 10.
104. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); R. GoLDrAa, supra note
14, at 43; McCarthy & Wahl, supra note 24, at 721-30.
105. In a reply by the extradition office for the Governor of Illinois as to the extent
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The present Florida bail system 06 differs very little from that of most
other states. Presumably, its operation also varies little from them so that
the abuses and inequities associated with the commercial bonding system
continue to exist. Although the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 was the
result of long months of careful research and planning to eliminate these
abuses and inequities, it is not the only alternative available.10r Since 1965
at least, seven states have enacted statutes to encourage their courts to release
defendants on recognizance rather than on deposit of money bond.108 Unfortunately, these statutes by their wording permit courts to continue, in their
discretion, the long established bail practices to which they have become
accustomed. There is evidence that in their operation these statutes do not
produce a departure from the proposition that the posting of a money bond
will be the presumptive method of obtaining release in state courts. 0 9
Instead, they are merely a reissuance of preexisting law."0 ° On the other hand,
a model provision recommended by the American Bar Association encourages
a policy of presuming releasability. 11 Whether or not Florida decides to
make use of this model provision, it must solve its bail problem if it hopes
to provide justice for rich and poor alike and to eliminate a system easily
manipulated by lower courts to accomplish sub rosa purposes subject to
question. The sentiment aroused by the concern that we may thereby be
"coddling" criminals may perhaps be answered by these words spoken by
Sir Winston Churchill more than a half-century ago:" 2
The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of any country.
A calm, dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused .
unfailing faith that there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the
heart of every man. These are the symbols, which in treatment of
crime and criminal, mark and measure the stored up strength of a
nation, and are sign and proof of the living virtue within it.

to which bondsmen pay the expenses of returning bail jumpers, it was stated: "It would
seem to me that the argument that the expenses in returning bail jumpers were being paid

by bondsmen is fallacious." In effect, the government was paying the cost. See 1965
Hearingsat 192.
106. See generally FLA. CONSr. Dled. of Rights §§8,9; FLA. STAT. §905.19 (1967); FLA. R.
CraM. P. 1.130 (1967).
107. See, e.g., 1965 Hearings at 307; R. GOLDFARB, supra note 14, at 212.
108. LA. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 336 (West 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §638-A
(1967); Omo REv. CODE §2937.29 (Anderson 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §1334 (Supp.
1966); ORE. REV. STAT. §140.720 (1965); TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoC. art. 17.03 (1966); W. VA.
CODE ANN.

§§62-le-2 to -9 (1966).

109. See Murphy, State Control of the Operation of Professional Bail Bondsmen, 36 U.

CrN. L. REv. 375 (1967).
110. Id. at 406.

111. A.B.A. STANDAmRS RELAT G TO PrRuL RELAsE (Project on Minimum Standards
for Criminal Justice) (tent.draft) (1968).
112. 29 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 19 (1910).
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CONCLUSION

Arising from an obscure background in early English law, the law of bail
has evolved more slowly than the highly complex society of today. The primary purpose of bail - to allow the release of the accused while securing
his appearance in court - has been thwarted in the United States by the rise
of the commercial bondsman and his profit motive. At least four compelling
reasons can be cited for the proposition that pretrial detention should be
avoided if possible:
(1) There is a presumption that the accused is innocent.
(2) Pretrial detention has a tremendous impact on the accused's
private life - denying him freedom itself and possibly costing him his
means of earning a living.
(3) Imprisonment before trial has an impact on the outcome of
judicial proceedings -forcing guilty pleas in some cases, affecting
the verdict or sentence or both in others.
(4) Pretrial imprisonment is costly and causes overcrowded jail
conditions.
Nevertheless, the number of accused who remain imprisoned before their
trials continues to be substantial. This can be directly attributed to the
fact that few defendants are released on recognizance and of the remaining
majority only those wealthy enough to afford bail premiums are released. The
present bail system is capable of abuse by lower court judges and prosecutors
in a variety of ways.
Alternatives to the commercial bail systems have become more than a
mere possibility in light of recent federal and (limited) state legislation
based on careful studies of the problems involved. Such an alternative has
already been proposed but rejected by the Florida legislature. A better
understanding of the evils caused by the operation of the current bail system
may perhaps lead to long needed reform legislation in the near future.

J.
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